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 Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of 
One ’ s Own Body 
 FREDERIQUE  DE VIGNEMONT 
 Abstract :  What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one 
experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as 
one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite 
feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link 
between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played 
by the body schema. 
 ‘ Merely—you are my own nose. ’ 
 The Nose regarded the major and contracted its brows a little. 
 ‘ My dear sir, you speak in error ’ was its reply.  ‘ I am just myself—myself 
separately. ’ 
 Gogol (1835) 
 The body has an ambiguous status, as it seems to be both what we are and what 
belongs to us. The study of the relationship between the body and the self raises 
several distinct issues. First, there is the question of personal identity: would the 
prince be the same person if he had the cobbler ’ s body? Second, there is the 
question of the nature of the self: is the self only mental or also bodily? Third, 
there is the question of the sense of ownership: on which basis do I feel this body 
as my own? In this paper, I shall focus on the last question by investigating the 
conditions of possibility of the sense of ownership of one ’ s own body. 
 It may seem as if it was nonsensical to ask whether you are sure that this is your 
own body. The body that you feel is necessarily your own body. However, this 
does not imply that you necessarily  experience the body that you feel as your own. 
Indeed, some patients suffering from asomatognosia feel their own limb as alien, 
despite having tactile sensations in the  ‘ alien ’ limb. How can we account for such 
phenomenon? After reviewing different possibilities, I will argue for a spatial view 
of the sense of ownership that emphasizes the multimodal nature of the spatial 
representation of the body as well as its functional signiﬁ cance for action. 
 I would like to thank the  Mind & Language reviewers as well as Roblin Meeks and Tim Bayne 
for their helpful comments. This work was ﬁ nished with the help of the ARC International 
Linkage Award Grant. 
 Address for correspondence: Institut Jean-Nicod, 29 rue d’Ulm, 75005 Paris, France.
 Email:  fvignemont@isc.cnrs.fr 
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 1. Disownership and Ownership 
 Examiner: Whose arm is this? 
 A.R: It ’ s not mine. 
 Ex: Whose is it? 
 A.R: It ’ s my mother ’ s. 
 Ex: How on earth does it happen to be there? 
 A.R I don ’ t know. I found it in my bed. 
 Ex: How long has it been there? 
 A.R: Since the ﬁ rst day. Feel, it ’ s warmer than mine. The other day too, when 
the weather was colder, it was warmer than mine. 
 Ex: So, where is your left arm? 
 A.R: It ’ s under there (indeﬁ nite gesture forwards) ( Bisiach  et al. , 1991 , 
p. 1030) 
 1.1 A Sense of Disownership 
 Following a lesion of the right hemisphere, A.R suffers from somatoparaphrenia. 
She denies that her own arm belongs to her. In 1931, Guttmann already described 
a patient with a right parietal head injury who developed a generalized seizure 
preceded by  ‘ a feeling as if his left hand did not belong to him any longer  … that 
this hand was completely foreign and belonged to another person ’ ( Feinberg  et al. , 
1998 ). However, it is only with  Brion and Jedynak in 1972 that the phenomenon 
of  ‘ main étrangère ’ was tagged as such. They deﬁ ned it as a  ‘ feeling of estrangement 
between the patient and one of his hands ’ . Since then, there has been a widespread 
confusion in the literature between the Alien Hand and the Anarchic Hand, which 
are both often coined under the single term of  ‘ Alien Hand Sign ’ ( Marchetti and 
Della Salla, 1998 ). The  Anarchic Hand refers to the experience of autonomous 
semi-purposeful movements of the arm, which are experienced as alien to the 
patient ’ s volition. The  Alien Hand refers to a sense of disownership towards one ’ s 
own hand. Roughly speaking, the former is a disorder of action awareness; the 
latter is a disorder of body awareness. Some patients display both syndromes 
( Feinberg  et al. , 1998 ), but others not: their hand may feel  ‘ anarchic ’ , but they 
still feel it as their own hand. In this paper, I shall focus on the Alien Hand. In 
order to avoid any confusion, I will use the term  ‘ asomatognosia ’ to refer to the 
sense of disownership towards one ’ s own limb following a lesion of the right 
hemisphere. 
 Forms of disownership can be encountered in various cases. First, as previously 
described, it can occur following a brain lesion or an epileptic seizure in the parietal 
lobe of the right hemisphere ( Feinberg, 2002 ). It is then often associated with 
neglect of the external space and the bodily space (also called  ‘ personal neglect ’ ), 
somatosensory deﬁ cits, hemiplegia, anosognosia and Anarchic hand. However, as 
we will see later in more detail, asomatognosia cannot be reduced to any of these 
disorders ( Moro  et al. , 2004 ). Cases of sense of disownership have also been 
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reported following peripheral nerves disruption, like brachial plexus injury ( Sacks, 
1991 ), deafferentation ( Cole, 1995 ) or local anaesthesia ( Paqueron  et al. , 2003 ). 
Finally, feelings of disownership have been reported during psychiatric episodes. 
People suffering from depersonalization disorder feel the external world and their 
own body as unreal. More particularly, they complain about abnormal bodily 
experiences. Among them, they report  ‘ a lack of body ownership feelings ’ ( Sierra 
 et al. , 2005 ). This feeling may also explain the very surprising Body Integrity 
Identity Disorder (BIID). Individuals with BIID ask to have their healthy limbs 
amputated and they feel relieved when they have gone through surgery. One of 
the reasons that they mention is that the limb felt like it was not their own. 
However, other factors may also intervene in their decision ( Bayne and Levy, 
2005 ). 
 Are all these forms of disownership identical? It is difﬁ cult to say, given that we 
have access only to the patients ’ introspective reports. There are differences 
relative to the  ‘ alien ’ body part: denial of the limbs (particularly the upper limbs) 
and their extremities is most frequent, but the whole body can be affected, as 
occurs in deafferented patients and in patients with depersonalization disorder. 
There are also differences relative to the affective attitude toward the  ‘ alien ’ limb. 
While individuals with BIID want to cut it off, some asomatognosic patients view 
it as a  ‘ buddy ’ ( Feinberg  et al. , 1998 ). Finally, patients differ in attributing or not 
the  ‘ alien ’ limb to someone else or in even personifying it (e.g.  ‘ a mind of its 
own ’ , in  Leiguarda  et al. , 1993 ). This difference partly reﬂ ects the distinction 
between neurological patients (who attribute their limb to someone else, quite 
often to the examiner, but also to relatives, although they are not in the room) 
and psychiatric patients (who rarely attribute their limb to other people). This 
difference may also depend on the underlying cause of the sense of disownership. 
We can account for the feeling of disownership either by some additional features 
of bodily experiences indicating alienness or by the lack of features indicating 
ownership. In addition, the level at which the denial arises may differ. There 
are three possible scenarios leading to the sense of disownership of one ’ s 
own limb. 
 (a)  Patients experience their limb as alien, but they still believe that it 
belongs to them ( Sacks, 1991; Cole, 1995 ). 
 (b)  Patients experience their limb as alien and they believe that it does not 
belong to them. They attribute it to someone else ( Feinberg  et al. , 1998; 
Schiff and Pulver, 1999 ). 1 
 (c)  Patients experience their limb as their own, but despite that, they believe 
that it does not belong to them. 
  1  Some patients with asomatognosia attribute ownership to someone else, but they can be 
quickly corrected. Other patients maintain their delusional belief despite correction. For 
instance, Mirna cannot be convinced that this is her own hand:  ‘ Feinberg: Suppose I told 
you this was your hand? Mirna: I wouldn ’ t believe you ’ ( Feinberg  et al. , 2005 , p. 104). 
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 A sense of disownership can thus occur either at the phenomenological level or at 
the doxastic level or at both. In (a) and (c), patients do not take their own bodily 
experiences at face value, because they are overridden by other factors. This shows 
the complexity of the processing underlying the recognition of one ’ s own limbs. 
One may be entitled to believe that this hand is one ’ s own independently of what 
one feels. For instance, the spatial contiguity of the  ‘ alien ’ limb with the rest of 
one ’ s own body may sufﬁ ce to justify the belief that this is one ’ s own hand even 
if it does not feel like it. Body recognition is then inferred from sources of 
knowledge about the body (e.g. spatial contiguity), rather than directly based on 
bodily experiences. 2 
 I shall try here to understand how someone can  feel his own hand as alien, but 
for that, I need to use pathologies in which people  report that their limbs feel alien 
as data. Presumably, it is often the case that people who believe that their limbs are 
no longer their own do so because they experience them as alien. I will also limit 
myself mainly to asomatognosia, although even with the previous restrictions, 
asomatognosia remains open to different interpretations. I will assume here that 
the lesion leading to asomatognosia deprives the subject of some key features 
indicating ownership. But what is missing? 
 1.2 A Sense of Ownership 
 Intuitively, one would like to reply that what is missing is the sense of ownership, 
that is, the awareness of the body as one ’ s own. However, this reply is not very 
informative. What are the speciﬁ c features that specify that this is one ’ s own body? 
And what is it to feel this body as one ’ s own? The existence of a positive 
phenomenology of ownership is not obvious. At the doxastic level, the description 
of my bodily sensations includes a ﬁ rst-person component ( my hand is burning). 3 
But do I really experience that this is  my hand? 
 Even if there was no ﬁ rst-person component included in the content of bodily 
sensations, it does not imply that there is no sense of ownership provided by 
sensations. It would not be surprising that the sense of ownership was dim and elusive. 
The body stays indeed most of the time at the margin of consciousness ( Gurwitsch, 
  2  I am not interested here in this kind of ownership judgments, as they are disconnected 
from the experience of ownership. See  Marcel (2003) for an analysis of the different levels 
of self-attribution. My interest here is limited to what he calls  ‘ minimal self-recognition ’ and 
its experiential ground. 
  3  Interestingly, the ﬁ rst-person possessive term differs in some languages whether it concerns 
an inalienable body part (e.g. my head, which will always be mine) or an alienable object 
(e.g. my car, which can be sold). In addition, it is worth noticing that some languages make 
the distinction between different degrees of possession for body parts themselves. For 
instance, in Kilivila (the Australasian language of the Trobriand Islanders), proper body parts 
like arms or legs are always associated with a possessive pronominal sufﬁ x indicating a degree 
of intimate possession, while internal organs are associated with a possessive term indicating 
a more distant possession ( Senft, 1998 ). 
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1985 ). You rarely focus your attention on it. While typing on your laptop, you do 
not vividly experience your ﬁ ngers on the keyboard. Your conscious ﬁ eld is 
mainly occupied by the content of what you are typing. You do not feel that these 
are  your own ﬁ ngers. The phenomenology of the body is often recessive, except 
during intensely pleasant or unpleasant sensations. Yet, there are three sources of 
evidence, which suggest that there is a sense of ownership. 
 Imagine the following situation. You close your eyes and someone takes your 
hand. Nothing in your experience tells you who is holding your hand. Yet, you 
feel this anonymous hand holding  your own hand and nobody else ’ s hand. There 
seems to be a phenomenological difference between your experience of someone 
else ’ s hand and your experience of your own hand, which could be explained by 
a sense of ownership. 
 Let us now see what happens when you see someone being touched. You are 
able to directly (non-inferentially) compare what she feels with what you would 
feel if you were touched. Indeed, it has been shown recently that observing 
someone being touched partially elicits the same activation in the somatosensory 
cortex in the observer as if the observer was being touched at the same location 
( Keysers  et al. , 2004 ). Even more surprisingly, a woman reported feeling tactile 
sensations on her own skin when observing another person being touched 
( Blakemore  et al. , 2005 ). Similarly, it was shown that observing pain in others 
partially activates the same neural network as that when experiencing pain ( Singer 
 et al. , 2004 ). In addition, it elicits the same muscle response ( Avenanti  et al. , 2005 ). 
Given this  ‘ transparency of bodily experiences ’ , we can immediately recognize 
that we feel the same by a kind of empathy ( Dokic, 2003 ). However, the mapping 
between self and other does not lead to a confusion between self and other. We 
do not confuse our sensations with someone else ’ s sensations, nor do we feel our 
own sensations in someone else ’ s body parts. Because representations of bodily 
sensations are shared between self and other, one needs to be able to differentiate 
one ’ s own body and someone else ’ s body ( Decety and Jackson, 2004 ). The sense 
of ownership results from this differentiation. 
 A ﬁ nal source of evidence comes from introspective reports of amputees 
wearing prosthesis. People have more or less difﬁ culty in accepting prosthesis and 
in integrating them in their body representation. Yet, some of them acquire a 
strong feeling of ownership toward their prosthesis, as shown by the following 
example: 
 Many amputees feel that their artiﬁ cial limb is somehow part of them, a simple 
example of this is that I wouldn ’ t like just anyone putting their hand on my 
artiﬁ cial knee, even though it is not actually part of my body ’ s ﬂ esh, it is still 
mine even though it ’ s a piece of plastic and metal ( Murray, 2004 , p. 970) 
 We can make sense of the difference between amputees who feel their artiﬁ cial 
limb as their own body part and those who do not by the presence of a sense 
of ownership. Interestingly, the embodiment of the prosthesis plays a central 
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role in the successful adaptation of the amputees to their new limb ( Murray, 
2004 ). 
 I have argued here for the existence of a positive phenomenology of the sense 
of ownership, even if recessive most of the time. We need now to understand 
what it consists in. 
 2. Bodily Sensations and the Sense of Ownership 
 Dokic (2003) suggests the following basic speciﬁ cation of the general form of 
bodily experiences: 
 ‘ Experience (a particular body part is F) ’ . 
 The content of this experience—described inside the brackets—includes two 
components: the descriptive content that represents the bodily property F and the 
spatial content that assigns a speciﬁ c location within a body part to the bodily 
property ( Bermúdez, 1998 ). Besides some general unspeciﬁ c sensations such as 
hunger or tiredness, bodily properties are localized in a speciﬁ c body part. This 
description can apply both to the ﬁ rst-person and to the third-person perspective, 
as required by the transparency view. However, there is nothing in such content 
that tells us whose body part is represented. What is the ground of the sense of 
ownership? 
 2.1 A General Panoptic 
 Given the transparency of bodily experiences, what makes the difference between 
my hand being touched and me seeing your hand being touched? It is time now 
to provide a theoretical panoptic of the different views about the sense of ownership 
(see  Dokic, 2003 ). The main question that we need to address is whether the sense 
of ownership is given by bodily sensations. If we reply  no to the question, then the 
sense of ownership consists in an additional quality, which may depend at 
the subpersonal level on a speciﬁ c mechanism of self-attribution. If we reply  yes to 
the question, then the sense of ownership derives from bodily sensations. But what 
in bodily sensations gives the sense of ownership? It may be the  way we have access 
to the body through bodily sensations, in contrast with external perception (e.g. I feel 
versus I see that the legs are crossed). Or it may be the  content of bodily sensations 
(e.g. the legs are crossed). In the latter case, the question is what in the content of 
bodily sensations gives the sense of ownership. It may be the  descriptive component of 
the content, that is, the bodily property that is experienced (e.g. being crossed). 
Alternatively, it may be its  mode of presentation , that is, the way the bodily property is 
represented (e.g. being crossed visually perceived versus proprioceptively felt). Or it 
may be the  spatial component of the content that assigns a speciﬁ c location to the bodily 
property (e.g. the legs). We have thus ﬁ ve hypotheses that I will sum up as follows: 
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 2.2 How to Account for Asomatognosia 
 Can asomatognosia settle the debate? By looking at the circumstances when the 
sense of ownership is missing, we will acquire a better understanding of what gives 
us the sense of ownership. A way to test the different hypotheses is to ask if 
individuals with asomatognosia have still bodily sensations in the affected limb and 
if these sensations differ from the sensations they have in the non-affected limb. 
 One could suggest that the sense of disownership is explained by the loss of 
bodily sensations. Interestingly, asomatognosia is frequently associated with 
hemianaesthesia and neglect. Personal neglect is so often associated with 
asomatognosia that they even have been taken as synonymous. For instance, they 
both diminish after vestibular stimulation ( Bisiach  et al. , 1991; Schiff and Pulver, 
1999 ). However, the relation between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership 
is far more complex, as shown by the following experiments. First, somatosensory 
anaesthesia does not necessarily lead to the lack of the sense of ownership. In a 
study with normal subjects who have been locally anaesthetized, only 5 out of 36 
subjects denied the ownership of their limb ( Paqueron  et al. , 2003 ). These persons 
were still able to correctly perceive the position of the limb while blindfolded. It 
shows that they still have access to proprioceptive information. However, the 
question here is not whether somatosensory information provides the sense of 
ownership, but rather whether somatosensory experiences do it. More interesting 
is the case of AF and SB ( Moro  et al. , 2004 ). These two patients had a lesion of 
the right hemisphere. They suffered from neglect, hemiplegia, proprioceptive and 
tactile deﬁ cits and asomatognosia of the left upper limb. It has been shown that 
positioning the neglected left hand in the non-neglected right hemispace decreases 
attentional neglect ( Aglioti  et al. , 1999 ). Moro and collaborators investigated 
whether it could also improve asomatognosia. As predicted, they showed that the 
patients were able to feel tactile sensations in the left arm when the left arm was 
located in the right hemispace (which was not neglected). However, despite feeling 
 
Do bodily sensations give the sense of ownership?
YES NO
Perceptual mode
Cf. Evans (1982)
Perceptual content
Descriptive Spatial
Cf. Martin (1995)
Mode of presentation Property
Cf. Dokic(2003)
Extra quality
 
 Figure  1  Panoptic of different views about the sense of ownership 
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that they were touched, AF and SB still felt their left arm as alien. When asked 
how it was possible to perceive in someone else ’ s hand, AF replied that  ‘ many 
strange things can happen in life ’ ( Moro  et al. , 2004 , p. 440). However, when 
asked about the ownership of his intact hand, SB replied  ‘ it would be strange to 
feel others ’ body parts as one ’ s own ’ ( Moro  et al. , 2004 , p. 441). 4 
 These results are counterintuitive. As SB said, how could one perceive from the 
inside someone else ’ s body parts? Nevertheless, they provide a clear dissociation 
between tactile sensations and sense of ownership. Patients can experience a bodily 
property localized in a body part that they feel as alien. I take at face value the 
subjects ’ introspective reports and I would like to assume here that this dissociation 
occurs at the phenomenological level, and not at the doxastic level. If this is the 
case, then what does it tell us about the sense of ownership? 
 A ﬁ rst way to interpret these results, which I will not endorse, is to claim that 
bodily sensations do not provide the sense of ownership. We have seen indeed that 
people can still feel their limb as their own while being anaesthetized ( Paqueron  et al. , 
2003 ). However, one may reply that bodily sensations may be sufﬁ cient, although 
not necessary for the sense of ownership. More challenging is the fact that one could 
have bodily sensations felt in a certain body part without feeling this body part as 
one ’ s own. Does it mean that the sense of ownership consists in an additional quality 
 ‘ over and above ’ bodily experiences? The ﬁ rst problem with this hypothesis is that 
we do not know on what ground the extra quality of ownership would be based. 
But more fundamentally, we are not entitled to draw such a radical conclusion on 
the sole basis of these results. We previously distinguished between different aspects 
of bodily sensations that may account for the sense of ownership. Some aspects may 
be challenged by these results, but not necessarily all of them. 
 The presence of bodily sensations in the  ‘ alien ’ hand refutes the view that the 
sense of ownership is provided by the perceptual mode of bodily sensations. I want 
to argue that the perceptual mode of AF ’ s and SB ’ s sensations does not differ when 
their  ‘ alien ’ hand is touched and when their  ‘ owned ’ hand is touched. In both 
cases, they receive the same kinds of information (no visual input, only tactile 
inputs). Furthermore, this is not a case of  ‘ numbsense ’ where subjects process 
tactile information, but have no perceptual experience associated with their 
processing ( Rossetti  et al. , 1995 ). Here, they consciously felt the touch in both 
hands, with 100% accuracy. One may still argue that their tactile experience 
remained abnormal for the left hand, which would explain their feeling of 
disownership. However, AF and SB did not report any difference in their tactile 
  4  Other similar cases have been reported in the literature.  Melzack (1990) described a patient 
who screamed when the examiner squeezed his  ‘ alien ’ hand, but who still denied that this 
hand belonged to him.  Bottini  et al. (2002) also reported a case of an asomatognosic patient 
who was unable to report touches delivered on her left hand and who attributed it to her 
niece. When told that she would be touched on the left hand, she said she felt nothing. 
However, when told that she would be touched on her niece ’ s hand, her tactile anaesthesia 
completely recovered. This surprising result is interesting, but difﬁ cult to interpret. 
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experience. In addition, other patients have similarly recovered from tactile 
extinction by changing the position of their hand, without denying the ownership 
of their hand ( Smania and Aglioti, 1995 ). It thus seems accurate to claim that AF 
and SB had similar tactile experiences for both hands. Despite that, they did not 
feel the hand as their own in one case, while they did in the other case. 
Consequently, I claim that the perceptual mode of bodily sensations does not 
sufﬁ ce to provide the sense of ownership. 
 However, the lack of sense of ownership may be explained by differences at the 
level of the content of bodily sensations. Again, there seems to be no salient 
difference for the descriptive component of the content. More particularly, the felt 
property is the same in both cases. As for the mode of presentation, it does not 
seem a plausible candidate for independent reasons. Let us imagine that the same 
bodily property could be presented under the mode M  ‘ from the inside ’ and under 
the mode M ’  ‘ from the outside ’ and that they are not intensionally transparent. 
Consequently, I would not necessarily know that my bodily condition under the 
mode M is identical to yours under the mode M ’ in the same way that I do not 
necessarily know that Hesperus refers to the same planet as Phosphorus ( Dokic, 
2003 ). If so, bodily experiences could not be immediately recognized as shared. In 
other words, they would not be transparent. This possibility goes against the 
hypothesis of shared representations of bodily sensations ( Keysers  et al. , 2004; 
Singer  et al. , 2004; Decety and Jackson, 2004 ). Therefore, we should reject modes 
of presentation of bodily properties analogous to Fregean modes of presentation. 
Consequently, the mode of presentation of bodily sensations cannot be the basis of 
the sense of ownership. 
 To sum up, the descriptive content of the sensations felt in the  ‘ alien ’ hand 
cannot account for the lack of sense of ownership. On the one hand, the property 
that is felt in the  ‘ alien ’ hand and in the  ‘ owned ’ hand is the same. On the other 
hand, there is no difference between modes of presentation as it would prevent 
the transparency of bodily experiences. 
 The spatial component is all that remains. At this level, there is obviously a 
difference. The tactile sensation is felt either in the right hand (owned) or in the 
left hand (alien). The point here is not that it is a right or a left hand. It is rather 
that the bodily property is ascribed to a speciﬁ c location within the spatial 
representation of the body. One may therefore suggest that the content of bodily 
sensations in the  ‘ alien ’ hand is different because the spatial representation where 
the body part is located is different. I will from now on analyse the validity of what 
I shall call the Spatial Hypothesis: the sense of ownership derives from the spatial 
representation of the body. 
 3. The Spatial Hypothesis 
 Ayer (1963) suggested that bodily sensations deﬁ ne the boundaries of one ’ s 
own body: 
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 … it is a deﬁ ning property of  ‘ my ’ body to be the locus of my organic 
sensations. This would not entail that these sensations could never be located 
outside my body, but only that any human body in which they were located 
would necessarily be mine ( Ayer, 1963 , p. 55). 
 He described here what  Dokic (2003) calls  ‘ the fact of ownership ’ (why bodily 
sensations are necessarily about one ’ s own body), rather than the sense of ownership 
(why I experience the body parts that I feel as mine).  Martin (1995) provides a 
more interesting view. He reduces the sense of ownership to the sense of the 
boundaries of one ’ s own body. The spatial structure of bodily sensations is such 
that sensations are necessarily experienced within the boundaries of one ’ s own 
body. Indeed, in bodily experiences, there is nothing that does not fall within the 
limits of the somatosensory ﬁ eld. In contrast, the boundaries of the object that I 
see are not co-extensive with the visual ﬁ eld. However, Martin does not go into 
detail about the delineation of the boundaries of one ’ s own body. 
 I will now investigate the nature of the spatial representation of the body that 
underlies the sense of ownership. I assume the existence of a mental representation 
of the spatial disposition and relationship between the various parts of the body 
and the whole. The spatial representation of the body has to be distinguished from 
the objective physical body ( Merleau-Ponty, 1945 ). Body representations do not 
constitute a complete and accurate display of the body in our mind. For instance, 
one ’ s body representations may represent one ’ s own hand despite its amputation, 
as in the phantom limb phenomenon. Conversely, they may also omit one side of 
the body, as in personal neglect. I will now review the different sources of 
information that contribute to the spatial representation of the body. Perhaps we 
can determine how the boundaries of the self are represented by determining how 
the boundaries of the body are represented. 
 3.1 A Multimodal Spatial Representation of the Body 
 Martin assumes that bodily sensations are felt within the boundaries of the 
somatosensory representation of the body. However, this view does not account 
for the way one ’ s own body is spatially represented. Indeed, it relies on the 
assumption that bodily experiences are purely unimodal. This view can be tracked 
down to the modular architecture of the mind as postulated by  Fodor (1983) : the 
ﬁ rst levels of processing of sensory stimuli are encapsulated, isolated from the 
inﬂ uence of any other kind of information. However, recent experimental data 
about cross-modal effects suggest that this view is no longer sustainable ( Spence 
and Driver, 2004 ). We cannot reduce the representation of one ’ s own body to a 
purely somatosensory representation and neglect the preponderant role of visual 
information. Tactile stimuli are remapped into a visual frame of reference because 
of the dominant role of vision in action. Thus, the spatial content of tactile 
sensations is not only relative to the skin, but also relative to the current disposition 
of the body part that has been touched, as given by vision and proprioception. 
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Recent experimental results have shown that (1) bodily experiences are based on 
multimodal representation of the body and (2) even the primary stages of the 
somatosensory processing are affected by other kinds of information such that 
there is never a  ‘ pure ’ somatosensory ﬁ eld. 5 I review here three examples that 
provide evidence of the existence of a multimodal representation of the body (for 
more evidence, see  Gallagher, 2005 ). 
 Visual enhancement of spatial resolution of touch : The sight of body parts increases 
tactile spatial sensitivity in two-point discrimination, and tactile spatial resolution 
in orientation judgement ( Kennett  et al. , 2002 ). This effect of visual tuning of 
tactile processing occurs at an early stage in stimulus elaboration and perception. 
Indeed, transcranial magnetic stimulation over primary somatosensory cortex 
signiﬁ cantly reduces subjects ‘ accuracy while viewing the hand, but not while 
viewing a neutral object at the same location ( Fiorio and Haggard, 2005 ). 
 Visual disruption of temporal order judgement in touch : If your hands are crossed 
while you are being touched on both hands, you have difﬁ culties in judging to 
which hand the ﬁ rst tactile stimulus was applied. This is due to the conﬂ ict between 
the body-centred spatial frame of reference and the external space, which both 
encode the location of tactile stimuli ( Yamamoto and Kitazawa, 2001 ). However, 
congenitally blind people do not show any effect of hands crossing, in contrast 
with sighted and late-blind people ( Röder  et al. , 2004 ). Vision puts spatial 
constraints on tactile processing, even if there is no visual information currently 
available. 
 Multimodal body distortion : In the Pinocchio experiment, the examiner induces 
illusory arm extension by tendon vibration ( Lackner, 1988 ). If subjects at the same 
time hold their nose, they experience their nose as elongating by as much as 30 cm. 
They feel that their arm is moving away from them, but still feel their nose. Since 
the head and the body are stationary, the combined sensory input is interpreted as 
the nose elongating. This experiment reveals that the representation of the body 
boundaries results from the integration of kinaesthetic, vestibular, proprioceptive, 
and tactile sources of information. 
 The multisensory nature of body representation has often been neglected by the 
philosophical tradition, which has focused more on contrasting the body with 
other physical objects, or bodies of other people ( Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Bermúdez, 
1998 ). However, these results (among others) show that bodily sensations must be 
understood against the background of a multimodal representation of the body. 
  5  These cross-modal effects may rely on two kinds of neural mechanisms. Electrophysiological 
studies in the monkey have shown in the premotor and the parietal cortex the existence of 
bimodal neurons that combine visual and somesthetic signals ( Duhamel  et al. , 1997; Graziano, 
Cooke and Taylor, 2000 ). Furthermore, recent experiments suggest that back-projections 
from multimodal areas to unimodal areas may also play a role ( Macaluso, Frith and Driver, 
2000; Taylor-Clarke, Kennett and Haggard, 2002 ). Thus, primary areas may be unimodal in 
terms of their afferent information, yet they may be affected by other kinds of signals. We 
can no longer assume that the ﬁ rst levels of processing of sensory stimuli are encapsulated. 
As  Driver and Spence (2000) said, cross-modal effects are  ‘ beyond modularity ’ . 
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This has some consequences for the sense of ownership. According to the spatial 
hypothesis, the sense of ownership is given by the spatial content of bodily 
sensations. However, the previous results indicate that bodily sensations are felt 
within a multimodal spatial representation of the body. 6 One consequence of such 
a view is that the sense of ownership should be inﬂ uenced by visual information. 
 Botvinick and Cohen (1998) show that we can indeed alter the sense of ownership 
by artiﬁ cially generating intermodal matching. 
 The subject ’ s hand is hidden behind a screen and he sees instead a rubber hand 
directly in front of him. If both hands (the real and the fake ones) are stroked 
synchronously, the subject feels the touch not of the hidden brush on his real 
hand, but of the viewed brush on the rubber hand. Proprioceptive information 
decays rapidly when the hand stays stationary, while vision often predominates 
over other sensory modalities ( Welch and Warren, 1986 ). It is therefore not 
surprising that the spatial content of tactile sensations relies more on vision than on 
proprioception. This alteration leads to the distortion of the sense of body location: 
when subjects were required to reach the hand that had been touched with their 
other hand, their movement was displaced rightward toward the rubber hand. 
Furthermore, most of them felt a sense of ownership toward the fake hand:  ‘ I 
found myself looking at the dummy hand thinking it was actually my own ’ 
( Botvinick and Cohen, 1998 , p. 756). 
 This assertion is not metaphorical as subjects showed stronger skin condu c-
tance reactions when the fake arm was injured after synchronous stimulation 
compared to asynchronous stimulation ( Armel and Ramachandran, 2003 ). 
However, intermodal matching  per se does not sufﬁ ce to elicit the illusion. It has 
been shown that physical and postural similarities of the rubber hand with the 
real hand constrain the integration between vision and touch ( Tsakiris and 
Haggard, 2005 ). 
 Without multimodal interaction, the phenomenon of the rubber hand would 
not have been possible. 7 The sense of ownership results from the localisation of the 
tactile property within a body representation constructed on the basis of the 
information that is available to the subject (e.g. vision, touch and proprioception 
for most of the people). In the rubber hand illusion, the descriptive component of 
the tactile sensation is accurate, but not the spatial component. This interpretation 
is consistent with the spatial hypothesis. The fact that the sense of ownership 
results from bodily sensations—or at least from their spatial content—does not 
imply that it cannot be inﬂ uenced by other sources of information, like vision. 
  6  Interestingly, asomatognosia does not result from a lesion of the primary somatosensory area, 
but from a lesion of the parietal area where multimodal integration happens. 
  7  In a brain imaging study,  Ehrsson  et al. (2004) show the involvement of the premotor cortex 
in the rubber hand illusion. The premotor cortex is known to play an important role for 
multimodal integration. Other studies in developmental psychology also emphasize the role 
of visuo-proprioceptive calibration of the body for the acquisition of the sense of ownership 
in children ( Rochat, 1998 ). 
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 3.2 Body Schema and Body Image 
 According to the spatial hypothesis, the sense of ownership derives from the 
localisation of the bodily property within a spatial representation of the body. We 
argued that the boundaries of the body are not deﬁ ned only on the basis of 
somatosensory perception, but rather on the basis of the integration between 
different sensory modalities such as proprioception, touch and vision. In case of 
conﬂ ict, the reliability and the intensity of each of these modalities determine 
which of them predominates over the others ( van Beers  et al. , 2002 ). But is that all 
there is? Do we have here a full account of the sense of ownership? 
 It depends on which kind of spatial representation of the body we adopt. Indeed, 
there is not one single system of representation of the body. The body can be 
viewed from many different perspectives (e.g. semantic, emotional, spatial, motor, 
tactile, visual, proprioceptive, etc.) and described in terms of many pairs of opposing 
properties (e.g. conscious/unconscious, conceptual/non conceptual, dynamic/
static, innate/acquired). This diversity has led to a widely spread confusion about 
body representations. In order to clarify the conceptual landscape of the study of 
the body, it has been suggested that we need to distinguish between the body 
schema and the body image, a dichotomy that cuts across all the previous 
distinctions ( Paillard, 1999; Gallagher, 2005 ). 
 Both are multimodal, although the body image puts more emphasis on vision, 
and the body schema on proprioception. The difference between the two body 
representations, as I see it, is mainly functional. We can draw a parallel here with 
the two visual pathways.  Milner and Goodale (1995) distinguish two functions of 
vision, differentiating perception for action ( ‘ How ’ ) and perception for recognition 
( ‘ What ’ ). The dorsal visual pathway (infero-parietal) is dedicated to the agent ’ s 
interactions with the object and the ventral visual pathway (infero-temporal) is 
dedicated to the semantic process of the properties of the object. This functional 
distinction is usually applied to external objects, but we can extend it to body 
perception. The body schema is for action and the body image is for identiﬁ cation 
( Paillard, 1999 ). The former represents an unconscious functional sensori-motor 
map of the body based on the information one needs in order to move one ’ s own 
body (e.g. bodily posture and position, bodily constraints like size and strength of 
the limbs, kinematical constraints like the degree of freedom of the joints, etc). 
The latter is more heterogeneous. It groups all the information about the body 
necessary to make judgments about bodily properties. It includes a visuo-spatial 
map of the body, a semantic body representation and affective attitudes toward 
one ’ s own body. The body schema is disturbed in apraxia ( Sirigu  et al. , 1995 ). The 
body image (or at least the visuo-spatial body map) is disturbed in autotopagnosia 
( Sirigu  et al. , 1991 ). 
 Interestingly, either body representation can be used to locate tactile stimuli, as 
shown by the following double dissociation.  Merleau-Ponty (1945) reported the 
case of Schneider who was unable to describe the position of his body and to 
localize tactile stimulations, but who was still able to scratch his leg where a 
mosquito had bitten him. Indeed, patients with  ‘ numbsense ’ do not feel the tactile 
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sensations but are still able to point where they have been touched ( Rossetti  et al. , 
1995 ). In contrast, deafferented patients can identify their body part, but have 
difﬁ culties in reaching it, relying only a visuo-spatial body map ( Paillard, 1999 ). It 
thus seems that we use both frames of reference: the spatial bodily framework of 
one ’ s own actions and the detached map of one ’ s own body. One needs to know 
how to reach the stimulated body part in order to be able to react to the sensation. 
But one also needs to be able to consciously identify the location. In the absence 
of one of the two systems, the other can partially compensate for its missing 
partner. 
 3.3 The Role of Action 
 Given this distinction, which of these two kinds of body representation is the basis 
of the sense of ownership? First, let me emphasize that I am not asking whether 
bodily sensations are part of the body image or of the body schema. Sensations are 
conscious, they constitute what  Gallagher (2005) calls the  ‘ body percept ’ , and as 
such they are represented in the conscious body image. The relevant question here 
is about the spatial frame of reference of bodily sensations. Does the spatial content 
of bodily sensations relevant for the sense of ownership refer to the functional 
sensori-motor map of the body schema or to the visuo-spatial map of the body 
image? I would like to provide here some evidence in favour of the body 
schema. 
 A recent experiment shows that both afferent and efferent aspects of the moving 
body can inﬂ uence the sense of ownership ( Tsakiris  et al. , 2006 ). The rubber hand 
illusion was elicited on the sole basis of hand movements. Subjects did not see 
their hand, but saw a virtual hand projected in front of them. Both subjects ’ index 
ﬁ nger and the index ﬁ nger of the virtual hand moved up and down, either passively 
or actively. When the movements were synchronous, subjects felt that their own 
hand was closer to the virtual hand than when the movements were asynchronous 
( ‘ proprioceptive drift ’ ), like in the classical rubber hand illusion. In the passive 
condition, the illusion results from the integration between vision and 
proprioception. However, the active condition also involves efferent information 
signalling that the subject is moving his ﬁ nger. Interestingly, the proprioceptive 
drift affected only the index ﬁ nger in the passive condition (the other ﬁ ngers were 
not felt closer to the virtual hand), while in the active condition, it affected the 
whole hand, and not only the moving ﬁ nger. The effect was thus very local when 
based only on afferent information, and more global when based on afferent and 
efferent information. The authors concluded that efferent information inﬂ uences 
the sense of ownership of the body by unifying the body as a whole. More 
generally, the representation of the body moving (whether passively or actively) 
plays an important role in the sense of ownership. 
 The study of prosthesis and tool use also argues in favour of the importance of 
the body schema. We saw at the beginning that amputees can feel the prosthesis as 
part of their body and react in the same way as if it was their own limb. Using a 
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prosthesis involves motor adjustments. For instance, the weight of the prosthesis 
differs from the weight of a real limb. Therefore, in order to be able to properly 
use the prosthesis, the amputees have to integrate it in the functional map of the 
body schema. This hypothesis is conﬁ rmed by a recent brain imaging study that 
shows a shift of the centre of activation of the right posterior parietal cortex, 
indicating that the prosthesis is recognized as an alternative to the real hand 
( Maruishi  et al. , 2004 ). The prosthesis can be so well integrated that the person feels 
a sense of ownership towards it and may even forget that his limb was amputated: 
 And not too long ago I was lying in bed with my wife. I had removed my 
limb. We were eating some food I had cooked and I decided to get up and do 
the dishes. I reached over to take her plate, got up, and forgot I did not have 
my limb on. I fell on the ﬂ oor, landing on the distal end of the stump ( … ) So, 
I guess I have reached a point where I am capable of such foolish acts as that 
and forget  my leg was not on ( Murray, 2004 , p. 968, my emphasis). 8 
 Similarly, neural representations of the body may be altered when using a tool to 
extend the subject ’ s reaching space (for review see  Maravita and Iriki, 2004 ). 
Studies of bimodal neurons in monkey parietal cortex have focused on the spatial 
relation between visual and tactile receptive ﬁ elds. Tactile receptive ﬁ elds on the 
hand gradually displaced their visual receptive ﬁ eld from an initial position near 
the hand towards the tip of the tool, as a function of tool learning. In human 
subjects with unilateral lesions, active use of a tool improved the cross-modal links 
between visual stimuli at the tool tip and tactile events at the hand ( Maravita  et al. 
2002; Farne and Ladavas, 2000 ). These neural changes may underly the anecdotal 
observation that a person using a tool experiences tactile sensations at the tip of the 
tool ( Descartes, 1637 ). Indeed, when you cross two sticks and deliver mechanical 
stimulation to the tip of the sticks, you have difﬁ culties in making judgment 
of temporal order, in the same way than when you cross your hands ( Yamamoto 
 et al. , 2005 ). In other words, the bodily property is located within a spatial 
representation that includes the tool, that is, within the body schema. The spatial 
content of bodily sensations has to be understood relatively to the body schema. 
According to the spatial hypothesis, the sense of ownership is given by the spatial 
content. Therefore, the sense of ownership is given by the body schema. 9 
 If this is indeed the case, then we should ﬁ nd disturbances of the body schema 
in individuals who deny the ownership of their limb. As body schema deﬁ cits have 
  8  Similarly, after a few minutes of guiding the arm of a robot through a virtual reality apparatus, 
subjects reported that they felt  ‘ in ’ the robot, such that one of them was afraid to drop an 
object for fear that it might fall on his foot, as if it were really his arm that held the object 
( Cole  et al. , 2000 ). 
  9  Anecdotally, we may notice here that one does not feel one ’ s kidney as one ’ s own, even 
during painful sensations. As far as I know, there is no case of disownership of internal 
organs. One reason may be that internal organs are not represented in the body schema. 
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not been explicitly investigated in asomatognosia, we can only look for possible 
causes (e.g. lack of proprioceptive afference and attentional neglect) or consequences 
(e.g disruption of action control) of such deﬁ cits. 
 It has been suggested that the  ‘ alien ’ feeling experienced by deafferented patients 
was linked to their inability to control their body at the beginning of their 
neuropathy ( Gallagher and Cole, 1995) . Indeed, they recovered a sense of ownership 
as soon as they were able to control their limbs. Similarly, a partial disruption of 
the body schema could explain the lack of the sense of ownership in individuals 
with asomatognosia. Interestingly, most of the patients suffering from asomatognosia 
are either paralyzed (like AF and SB for example) or also suffer from the anarchic 
hand syndrome (they cannot control their  ‘ alien ’ hand). It would not be surprising 
therefore that their body schema is partly impaired.  Elson and Schaüble (2004) 
reported an interesting case of ictal asomatognosia caused by epilepsy, which shows 
a direct correlation between the feeling of disownership and the inability to move 
the  ‘ alien ’ limb. During his seizure, the patient felt his leg as alien and immediately 
fell. One possible interpretation is that the leg is not represented anymore in the 
sensori-motor map, which leads the patient both to fall and to feel that the leg does 
not belong to him. 
 The other alternative would be that asomatognosia is due to an impairment of 
the body image. However, there is some evidence that the visuo-spatial map is at 
least partly preserved. In Moro ’ s study, AF and SB do not display any kind of 
autotopagnosia. They are able to name the different parts of his body and to point 
to any body part on a drawing or on the examiner ’ s body. In a different study, 
when asked to draw their body, patients with asomatognosia both represented 
their  ‘ alien ’ limb ( Morin  et al. , 2002 ). 
 What about personal neglect, which is often associated with asomatognosia and 
which has been considered as a disorder of the body image ( Gallagher, 2005 )? I 
would like to suggest here another interpretation of personal neglect in terms of a 
disorder of the body schema. The classical Comb and Razor test of personal 
neglect investigates the explorative actions performed toward the left hemispace 
of the body, like brushing one ’ s hair, shaving, or putting on make-up ( McIntosh 
 et al. , 2000 ). The left body side is not the means of the action, but its goal. The 
ability to represent the body as a goal may be interpreted as part of the body 
schema, given the functional deﬁ nition we previously gave. This would provide a 
further evidence of an impairment of the body schema in asomatognosia. 
 I suggest thus that the body schema in individuals with asomatognosia is 
disturbed. Consequently, the bodily properties that asomatognosics experience can 
no longer be appropriately localized within the impaired body schema. They feel 
the tactile stimulus, but they can localize it only by using a different spatial 
representation, such as the visuo-spatial map. However, this spatial representation 
is not speciﬁ c to one ’ s own body and thus, it does not sufﬁ ce to provide the sense 
of ownership, as I will show in the next section. This claim needs of course more 
empirical evidence. One would have to explain why not all the patients with 
paralysis or body schema deﬁ cits suffer from asomatognosia. Unfortunately, I am 
 Habeas Corpus  443
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
not able to fully answer this question. All I could say is that it would be mistaken 
to assume that there is only one kind of deﬁ cit of the body schema ( de Vignemont, 
2006 ). One needs a better analysis of the components of the body schema in order 
to understand why asomatognosia happens sometimes and sometimes not. Yet, a 
speciﬁ c impairment of the body schema remains a good candidate to understand 
why asomatognosics deny the ownership of their limb. 
 3.4 Toward a Theory of the Sense of Ownership 
 The spatial hypothesis of the sense of ownership can be articulated as follow: 
 a.  The sense of ownership is grounded in the spatial content of bodily 
sensations. 
 b.  The bodily property that is felt is localised within the body schema. 
 c.  The sense of disownership can be accounted for by a disruption of the 
body schema. 
 d.  The sense of ownership is grounded in the body schema. 
 However, something seems to be missing in such a view. The sense of ownership 
is ﬁ rst characterized by its ﬁ rst-personal perspective: this is  my own body. Nowhere 
in the spatial hypothesis is there any reference to the ﬁ rst-person. How is the 
spatial content then able to ground the sense of ownership? This problem is already 
encountered by Martin ’ s view, which reduces the sense of ownership to a spatial 
sense of boundaries. The solution lies at the level of the body schema, which features 
two key properties for the ﬁ rst-person perspective. First, the spatial hypothesis can 
work if and only if the spatial body representation is self-speciﬁ c. It must be 
dedicated to the representation of one ’ s own body. The visuo-spatial body map 
does not respect this constraint. It represents indeed both one ’ s own body and the 
body of other people. For instance, people with autotopagnosia cannot locate 
body parts both on their own body and on the examiner ’ s body. The spatial frame 
of reference is external and independent of whose body it is. Therefore, there is 
no guarantee that sensations represented in one ’ s visuo-spatial map will be 
experienced as occurring in one ’ s own body. In contrast, the boundaries of the 
sensori-motor functional map are the boundaries of one ’ s own body in action. 
The body schema is not shared between the self and the other. It applies only to 
the subject ’ s own body, to her posture, and to the size and the strength of her 
limbs. In this sense, it is ﬁ rst-personal. Not because it represents the body as one ’ s 
own, but because it represents exclusively what counts as one ’ s own body. Second, 
the body schema represents the acting body. Based on Wittgenstein ’ s distinction in 
the Blue Book (1958), we may say that it represents the body as a subject, rather 
than as an object ( Gallagher, 2003 ). The body schema does not take the body as 
an object to perceive and identify, in contrast with the body image. Following the 
functional distinction we previously gave, it represents the body in so far as it is a 
means to perform an action and to reach a goal. Body schema refers thus to the 
444   F. de Vignemont 
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
body as subject, as actor, rather than as object perceived. As such, it can base a 
ﬁ rst-personal perspective on the body. 
 We showed the ﬁ rst-personal dimension of the body schema. However, we are 
still far from a ﬁ rst-person phenomenology. Indeed, the body schema is most of the 
time unconscious. One may then ask how it can be the basis of the conscious feeling 
of ownership. However, I do not claim that the content of bodily sensations includes 
a ﬁ rst-person component. I would like here to adopt Dokic ’ s solution to the problem 
of the phenomenology of the sense of ownership: the reference to the self is only 
implicit. I propose the following approximate description of bodily sensations: 
 Experience (a particular body part is F), where F is localised in a ﬁ rst-personal 
sensori-motor body map. 
 Notice that the content itself does not include a reference to the body schema. The 
judgment  ‘ my body part is F ’ makes explicit what is implicit in the bodily sensation. 
According to  Dokic (2003) , the transition from the experience to the judgment 
 ‘ this is my body ’ would be  ‘ primitively compelling ’ in  Peacocke ’ s (1992) sense. It 
means that the subject would ﬁ nd such transition to be self-evident independently 
of inferences from other premises and that the subject would not need to take the 
correctness of the transition to be answerable to anything else. The ﬁ rst-person 
phenomenology of the sense of ownership would thus consist in this  ‘ compellingness ’ 
from the bodily sensation to the judgment of self-attribution. 
 Is this judgment immune to error through misidentiﬁ cation relative to the ﬁ rst 
person pronoun ( Shoemaker, 1984 )? The question is not whether it is me or 
someone else that feels that the legs are crossed. The question is whether I can 
 know that it is my legs or someone else ’ s legs on the basis of the same bodily 
sensation. According to  Evans (1982) , the proprioceptive system is such that I am 
assured that my own body is always the spatial source of the information that I 
proprioceptively receive. The normal way of gaining knowledge about one ’ s own 
body through proprioception guarantees that proprioceptive self-ascriptions are 
immune to error through misidentiﬁ cation. Does asomatognosia challenge this 
claim? The same question was asked for the Anarchic hand ( Marcel, 2003 ). 
 Peacocke (2003) denies that the Anarchic Hand refutes the thesis of immunity to 
error with the following argument: 
 … the subject in Anarchic Hand knows, via proprioception and not by 
external visual or haptic perception, that someone ’ s hand moves. But the 
subject does also know that it is his hand that moves. ( Peacocke, 2003 , p. 109) 
 However, if the patient suffers both from asomatognosia and Anarchic hand, as it 
can happen, then it seems that the conjunction of both syndromes may challenge 
the principle of immunity. But does the patient really know that it is not his hand 
that moves? Actually, he cannot know it, because it is not true. He can know that 
someone ’ s hand is being touched through the normal ways of gaining tactile 
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knowledge. But his experience of disownership cannot ground a judgment that 
someone else ’ s hand is being touched. The patient can believe it of course. 
However, this belief will not be justiﬁ ed because the spatial content of the tactile 
sensation is not acquired by the normal ways of gaining self-knowledge. As we 
previously said, the visuo-spatial map does not allow one to make the distinction 
between one ’ s own body and someone else ’ s body, and therefore cannot ground 
any ownership judgment. Thus, asomatognosia and the Anarchic hand do not 
challenge the immunity principle. 10 
 A ﬁ nal consequence of the spatial hypothesis is that it introduces two different 
temporalities: the temporality of the sensation and the temporality of the body 
schema. Bodily sensations are occurrent experiences. Each time I am touched, I 
have an experience that lasts approximately as long as the touch itself. In contrast, 
the body schema—even if it is ﬂ exible and dynamic—has a permanency that lasts 
more than each single bodily experience. In successive sensations, bodily properties 
are thus located within a single long-lasting body representation that binds them 
together. They are all about the same body, my own body. In this sense, the sense 
of ownership does not depend only on a transient sensation; it also depends on 
a more durable representation of the body. Therefore, the sense of ownership, 
however minimal and immersed it can be, always has a further dimension. It 
provides for the continuity of the bodily self. 
 4. Conclusion 
 One can experience one ’ s limb as alien and believe that it belongs to someone else, 
despite the fact that one feels bodily sensations in the  ‘ alien ’ limb. Does it mean 
that the sense of ownership is an additional quality over and above bodily sensations, 
resulting from a subpersonal mechanism dedicated to self-recognition? Not 
necessarily. I have argued here for a more parsimonious explanation. Asomatognosia 
reveals that the perceptual mode of bodily sensations does not sufﬁ ce to provide 
the sense of ownership. However, it can be well explained by a spatial account of 
the sense of ownership. The sense of ownership arises from the spatial content of 
bodily sensations that localises bodily properties within the body schema. The sense 
of ownership thus derives from a sensori-motor map that deﬁ nes the spatial boundaries 
of one ’ s own body. These boundaries are ﬂ exible, depending on the integration of 
afferent and efferent information. By its relationship with the body schema, the 
sense of ownership of one ’ s own body is linked to the sense of agency of one ’ s own 
actions. These two aspects of self-consciousness are both grounded in action. 
 Institut Jean-Nicod 
CNRS-ENS-EHESS 
France 
 10  However, my account of immunity differs from Evans ’ account. Ownership judgments are 
warranted by the spatial content of the sensations, and not by their perceptual mode. 
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